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ABSTRACT: Regulation 2016/369 establishes an emergency support mechanism for the provision of 
humanitarian aid in response to natural or man-made disasters giving rise to severe wide-ranging 
humanitarian consequences within the European Union. Although its scope of application is much 
broader, the Regulation has been adopted as an emergency measure for the management of the 
ongoing refugee crisis. It is therefore promising to look at the newly established mechanism 
against the background of other measures adopted or proposed in response to the crisis. In this 
perspective, the Regulation appears to fit within an overall strategy whereby Union funding is used 
as an instrument of policy-making to bring about further centralization. Finally, the analysis of the 
mechanism, which is meant to provide support to Member States “in a spirit of solidarity”, suggests 
a few conclusions on the meaning of the principle of solidarity and its implications in the context of 
the refugee crisis. It is suggested that two very different visions of solidarity, an emergency-driven 
and a structural one, coexist and may interact with each other in two ways. 
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I. Introduction 
The massive inflow of migrants and asylum-seekers has put under unprecedented 
strain the resources of Member States at the southern borders of the Union (notably 
Greece), already hit by the economic and financial crisis.1 Not only it has affected their 
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1 For a comprehensive view of the phenomenon and its implications on European integration see B. 
NASCIMBENE, Refugees, the European Union and the “Dublin system”. The Reasons for a Crisis, in European 
Papers, 2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 101 et seq. 
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ability to effectively control their external borders, leading to a worrying crisis of the 
Schengen system, since the abolition of border controls at internal borders is 
intertwined with, and premised upon, the effectiveness of external border controls. It 
has also generated a serious humanitarian crisis. According to United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimates, more than 210,000 migrants reached Greece in 
October 2015 alone, and in spite of a significant reduction in the number of arrivals, 
another 158,000 crossed the Greek border between January and June 2016.2 With 
hotspots and refugee camps overcrowded3 and the likely increase of refugee flows 
following the recent failed coup in Turkey,4 the need for more efficient cooperation at 
European Union level for the provision of humanitarian assistance to asylum-seekers 
has become evident. 
It is against this factual background that the impact of Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 
the Council of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the Union 
should be assessed. The present contribution provides an analysis of the main features 
of the newly-established mechanism and examines its relationship with other EU 
instruments, assessing its place within the overall EU strategy for the management of 
the refugee crisis. Finally, since Regulation 2016/369 is admittedly based on the 
principle of solidarity, some tentative conclusions are drawn as to the possible 
significance of this principle for the EU common migration and asylum policy and on the 
role financial support mechanisms such as the one provided for by the Regulation play 
with a view to tackling the refugee crisis. 
II. The legal basis 
Regulation 2016/369 is based upon Art. 122, para. 1, TFEU, which authorizes the 
adoption of financial assistance measures “in a spirit of solidarity between Member 
States”. This provision grants the Council, upon proposal by the Commission, the power 
to adopt “measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe 
difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy”.  
Art. 122, para. 1, TFEU derives from Art. 103 EEC, a provision that allowed for the 
adoption of measures to mitigate difficulties arising in connection with the supply of 
products. However, this provision has now a much broader scope: since it refers to 
 
2 Greece data snapshot, 7 July 2016, data.unhcr.org. 
3 See, for instance, Detention condition in the Malakasa camp: fit for children?, in Statewatch, 22 July 
2016, statewatch.org. Living conditions in the Malakasa camp have been the object of an individual 
application before the European Court of Human Rights: see European Court of Human Rights, 
application of 15 March 2016, no. 14165/16, Sh. D. and others v. Greece. 
4 See P. OLTERMANN, Germany expects rise in political asylum claims after Turkish coup attempt, in The 
Guardian, 22 July 2016, www.theguardian.com. 
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difficulties in the supply of products only as an example, it seems perfectly possible for 
Art. 122, para. 1, TFEU, to apply to different situations. 
The broadening of its scope of application will arguably affect the interpretation of 
the provision by the Court of Justice. While in the past the case law has followed a 
restrictive approach, excluding that the mechanism could be invoked in areas falling 
within the scope of common policies,5 this reading may be no longer justified with 
regard to the phraseology adopted by the Lisbon Treaty. Indeed, it could be argued that 
today, more than a derogation from common rules, Art. 122, para 1, TFEU represents a 
tool to enhance integration by giving substance to the principle of solidarity.6 
One might wonder whether the Regulation could not have been based upon Art. 
122, para. 2, TFEU, which authorizes the Council, following a similar procedure, to grant 
financial assistance to a Member State “in difficulties or […] seriously threatened with 
severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control”.7 Arguably, however, the choice of the legal basis is correct, since Art. 122, para. 
2, only envisages the granting of financial assistance to Member States, whereas the 
“measures” to be adopted under para. 1 may encompass a broader range of 
instruments. Indeed, as will be seen, emergency support under the mechanism 
established by Regulation 2016/369 is not confined to financial contributions to 
Member States’ budgets. 
III. The main features of Regulation 2016/369  
Although the Regulation finds its raison d’être in the refugee crisis, it has a much 
broader scope, being potentially applicable to any natural or man-made disaster giving 
rise to “severe wide-ranging humanitarian consequences” (Art. 1, para. 1).  
Since the Regulation does not define the notion of “disaster”, it will have to be 
determined by reference to other legal texts. A definition is provided by Art. 4 of 
Decision 1313/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 
2013 on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, which states that “‘disaster’ means any 
situation which has or may have a severe impact on people, the environment, or 
 
5 Court of Justice, judgment of 24 October 1973, case 5/73, Balkan-Import-Export GmbH v. 
Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, para. 13; Court of Justice, judgment of 24 October 1973, case 9/73, Carl 
Schlüter v. Hauptzollamt Lörrach, para. 13; Court of Justice, judgment of 23 January 1975, case 31/74, 
Filippo Galli, para. 24. 
6 See, infra, para. VII. 
7 This provision was triggered during the first acute phase of the debt crisis for the establishment of 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the first facility for lending liquidity to Member 
States in financial difficulties. 
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property, including cultural heritage”. It is a rather broad and generic definition, in line 
with international practice.8 
Since the disaster justifying the need for emergency support may be “ongoing of 
potential”, it should be assumed that the mechanism may be activated on a preventive 
basis. However, the wording of Art. 1, para. 1, of the Regulation may effectively limit the 
preventive use of the mechanism. Indeed, the very prospect of activating emergency 
support in view of a “potential” disaster appears to be in contradiction with the 
requirement that its consequences reach a certain scale, unless it is considered that 
also the effects can be potential and that the measure may be authorized on the basis 
of an ex ante assessment of their likelihood. 
The procedure for the activation of the emergency support reflects the urgent need 
for intervention: the Council shall examine the Commission proposal “immediately” and 
its decision must be taken “in accordance with the urgency of the situation”.9 
As to the actions that are eligible for funding, the Regulation states that emergency 
support may be provided for the same humanitarian aid actions envisaged by 
Regulation (EC) 1257/96 of the Council of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid,10 
i.e. assistance, relief and, “where necessary”, protection operations to save and 
preserve life in disasters or in their immediate aftermath.11 It is furthermore required 
that the measures adopted be “appropriate to the economic situation”, a condition that 
echoes a proportionality assessment but specifically focuses on the economic 
consequences of the event justifying the granting of emergency support. 
The implementation of the mechanism is entrusted to the Commission or partner 
organizations it selects. Art. 3, para. 4, of the Regulation includes a non-exhaustive list 
of entities that the Commission may select as partner organizations: it includes NGOs, 
“specialized services” of the Member States or “international agencies and organizations 
having the requisite expertise”. The provision also adds that “in doing so” the 
Commission shall closely cooperate with the affected Member State. The wording is 
somewhat ambiguous in that it might refer either, more generally, to the 
implementation of the emergency support mechanism or to the selection of partner 
organizations. While a textual reading suggests the latter interpretation, it is the entire 
procedure, as prescribed by art. 1, para. 2, that shall be based on cooperation between 
the Commission and the Member State. The need for cooperation with national 
authorities is especially acute considering that the Union intervention is only 
 
8 M. GESTRI, La risposta alle catastrofi nell’Unione europea: protezione civile e clausola di solidarietà, in M. 
GESTRI (a cura di), Disastri, protezione civile e diritto: nuove prospettive nell’Unione europea e in ambito penale, 
Milano: Giuffrè, 2016. 
9 Art. 2, para. 2, of Regulation 2016/369, cit. 
10 Art. 1 and Art. 2 of the Regulation define humanitarian aid by reference to its objectives, whereas 
Art. 4 contains a list of actions eligible for funding under the Regulation. 
11 See Art. 3, para. 2, of Regulation 2016/369, cit. 
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complementary to measures adopted by the Member States and in order to enhance 
the overall effectiveness of the instrument. 
As to the methods of implementation of Union funding, the Regulation refers to the 
procedures laid down by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 966/2012 on the financial rules 
applicable to the general budget of the Union (so-called financial regulation),12 
complemented by very few specific rules.13 The resources used to implement emergency 
support operations shall come from the general budget of the Union or from 
contributions made by public or private donors (art. 4, para. 2). According to Art. 5 of the 
Regulation, EU funding under the emergency support mechanism may cover up to the 
entire amount of eligible costs, to be determined by reference to Regulation 966/2012. 
Since the entire scheme is based upon EU funding of actions carried out by third 
parties, the Regulation also includes some provisions aimed at protecting the financial 
interests of the Union. With a view to preventing and combating fraud, Art. 8 authorizes 
the Commission to take “appropriate measures” ensuring that both preventive actions 
and effective checks, assisted by administrative and financial penalties, are put in place. 
The Regulation also extends to the management of funds under the emergency support 
mechanism the investigative powers of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). It shall 
further be ensured that clauses empowering such institutions and bodies to conduct 
audits and investigations are provided for in contracts and agreements concluded with 
third parties for the management of funds. 
IV. Compliance with international law and the impact on the scope 
of application of EU law  
Art. 3, para. 3, of the Regulation mandates respect for humanitarian principles. It 
echoes Art. 214, para. 2, TFEU, concerning the operations in the field of humanitarian 
aid conducted by the EU in third countries. Together with the principles of impartiality, 
neutrality and non-discrimination, the Regulation also mentions the principle of 
independence, which was omitted by the drafters of Art. 214, para. 2, TFEU. Conversely, 
the latter prescribes “compliance with the principles of international law”, not explicitly 
mentioned by the Regulation. However, as any other EU secondary law act, the 
implementing measures will still have to comply with the international agreements to 
which the EU is a party and with customary international law. Additionally, they will 
have to be consistent with EU primary law, including, obviously, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).  
 
12 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council 
Regulation (EC, EURATOM) 1605/2002. 
13 See Regulation 2016/369, Art. 4, cit. 
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An interesting question is whether the granting of emergency support is enough to 
trigger the application of EU law (including the Charter) to actions taken by Member 
State authorities and funded through the mechanism. In this regard, it should be 
recalled that, according to Art. 51, para. 1, of the Charter, its provisions are addressed 
to the Member States “only when they are implementing Union law”. The Court has 
interpreted this requirement rather extensively, especially in Åkerberg Fransson, where it 
assumed that even a tenuous link could trigger the application of EU law.14 Therefore, it 
can be safely argued that the Charter applies in such situations. 
V. The immediate implementation of the mechanism: emergency 
support as an instrument to face the refugee crisis 
The immediate aim of the Regulation is to provide funding for humanitarian aid to 
refugees, in order to support Member States facing large inflows of asylum-seekers.15 It 
is a situation that one of the recitals describes as “a notable example” of disaster 
directly affecting the economic situation of Member States, hence justifying the 
activation of the mechanism.16 It is therefore not surprising that, in addition to 
establishing the mechanism in general terms, the Regulation directly authorizes the 
provision of emergency support for the current influx of migrants, for a period of three 
years (Art. 9). 
Following its entry into force, the Commission promptly adopted an implementing 
decision in mid-April 2016.17 It provides for the financing of the mechanism for 2016, 
making immediately available an amount of 100 million euro and authorizing further 
expenditure from the general budget of the Union up to the overall amount of 300 
million euro, of which 3 million are specifically dedicated to technical support. 
VI. Complementarity and consistency 
In several instances the text of the Regulation refers to its complementarity vis-à-vis 
other measures. 
Firstly, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, expressly recalled by recital 
13, it is complementary to Member States’ actions, which the mechanism does not 
replace (Art. 1, para. 2). Member States thus remain chiefly responsible for addressing 
the consequences of events justifying activation of the emergency support and notably, 
 
14 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 May 2013, case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, para. 
25-27. 
15 See recital 3 of Regulation 2016/369. 
16 Recital 2 of Regulation 2016/369. 
17 Decision C(2016) 2214 final of the Commission of 15 April 2016 on the financing of emergency 
support in favour of the affected Member States in response to the current influx of refugees and 
migrants into the Union to be financed from the 2016 general budget of the European Union. 
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in the context of the refugee crisis, for providing humanitarian assistance to migrants 
and asylum-seekers. 
Secondly, the Regulation is also complementary to other EU measures, as it is 
neither the only instrument for granting support of a macro-financial nature to the 
Member States nor the only measure for the provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Interestingly, the complementarity relationship existing between the emergency 
support mechanism and other EU measures is explicitly mentioned by Art. 6 of the 
Regulation, which provides that “synergies and complementarity shall be sought with 
other instruments of the Union”. Art. 6 lists some of those acts: Regulation (EC) 
2012/2002,18 Decision (EU) 1313/2013/EU,19 Regulation (EC) 1257/96,20 Regulation (EU) 
223/2014,21 Regulation (EU) 513/2014,22 Regulation (EU) 514/2014,23 Regulation (EU) 
515/201424 and Regulation (EU) 516/2014.25 
Among the measures the provision refers to, the most significant is arguably 
Regulation 2012/2002, which established a solidarity mechanism for the provision of 
coordinated responses to natural disasters. Additionally, mutual assistance can be 
provided under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, but this tool is deemed 
insufficient26 since it is based on voluntary contributions by Member States. 
The emergency support mechanism introduced by Regulation 2016/369 is equally 
complementary to assistance and support that may be provided through existing Union 
instruments in the context of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. For instance, EU 
measures on border control, such as the Regulation (EU) 1052/2013 of the European 
 
18 Regulation (EC) 2012/2002 of the Council of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union 
Solidarity Fund. 
19 Decision (EU) 1313/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 an a 
Union Civil Protection Mechanism. 
20 Regulation (EC) 1257/96 of the Council of 20 June 1996 concerning humanitarian aid. 
21 Regulation (EU) 223/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 on the 
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived. 
22 Regulation (EU) 513/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for police 
cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management and repealing Council Decision 
2007/125/JHA. 
23 Regulation (EU) 514/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general 
provisions on the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund and on the instrument for financial support for 
police cooperation, preventing and combating crime, and crisis management. 
24 Regulation (EU) 515/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing, as part of the Internal Security Fund, the instrument for financial support for external 
borders and visa and repealing Decision 574/2007/EC. 
25 Regulation (EU) 516/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and 
repealing Decisions 573/2007/EC and 575/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Council Decision 2007/435/EC. 
26 See Regulation 2016/369, recital 5. 
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Parliaments and of the Council of 22 October 2013 establishing the European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR)27 and the proposed Regulation for the establishment of a 
European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) that should replace European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (FRONTEX),28 do provide 
support, although of a different kind, to Member States and appear to be premised on a 
certain degree of solidarity.29 Assistance and support under such instruments, however, is 
limited and only ancillary to the pursuit of their primary policy goals. 
Finally, and most importantly, the Regulation is complementary to other measures 
adopted or planned for the management of large migration flows from third countries. 
The Regulation should thus be viewed as part of a wider picture comprising a variety of 
measures, the main features of which have been outlined in a Commission 
Communication adopted in September 2015 and dedicated to the management of the 
refugee crisis.30 The Communication, which complements the previously published 
Agenda on Migration,31 sets priorities and guidelines on three levels: operational, legal 
and budgetary. 
First, on the operational side, the Commission strategy provides for a variety of 
actions, including the full implementation of the “hotspot” approach, schemes for the 
relocation of people in need of international protection and measures improving the 
effectiveness of return decisions.  
The second pillar of the Commission strategy aims at ensuring full implementation 
of EU law. In addition, a number of measures have been adopted or proposed that not 
only address issues of operational nature but also modify the relevant legal 
framework.32 
 
27 For a critical comment on the Regulation, see J. RIJPMA, M. VERMEULEN, EUROSUR: Saving Lives or 
Building Borders?, in European Security, 2015, p. 454 et seq. 
28 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border 
and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) 863/2007 and Council Decision 
2005/267/EC, COM(2015) 671 final. 
29 See P. DE BRUYCKER, The European Border and Coast Guard: A New Model Built on an Old Logic, in 
European Papers, 2016, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 566 et seq. 
30 Communication COM(2015) 490 final/2 of 29 September 2015 from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council, Managing the refugee crisis: immediate 
operational, budgetary and legal measures under the European Agenda on Migration. For a comment, see S. 
CARRERA, S. BLOCKMANS, D. GROS, E. GUILD, The EU’s Response to the Refugee Crisis. Taking Stock and Setting 
Policy Priorities, in CEPS, 16 December 2015, www.ceps.eu. 
31 Communication COM(2015) 240 final of 13 May 2015 from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A 
European Agenda on Migration. 
32 The complete list, including many soft law instruments, is available on the Commission website: 
ec.europa.eu. 
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Finally, the Commission strategy also comprises a financial and budgetary 
dimension, which has so far attracted much less attention33 compared to the well-
known deficiencies of asylum policy — aptly described as being far from a truly 
common asylum system34 — and the increasingly “securitarian” trend in the 
management of external borders.35 Yet, the scale of resources that the Commission has 
mobilized or envisaged to mobilize is unprecedented. The Commission indicates that a 
total of 1.7 billion euro have been or will be devoted to the management of the refugee 
crisis in 2015 and 2016.36 Despite contentions that “there is a fair amount of double 
counting”,37 the figures are certainly impressive. 
The emergency support mechanism established by Regulation 2016/369 is part of 
this effort and could be seen as a component of an overall strategy aimed at making 
funding an instrument for policy-making.38 This view assumes that, by using funding as 
a leverage, the Commission will be able to gradually push for further centralization in 
the management of the refugee crisis. Apparently, a similar trend is also noticeable in 
the field of external border control policy, as exemplified by the EBCG proposal, which 
some commentators view as an intermediary step towards further centralization of 
border controls at the EU level.39 
VII. The ambiguity of solidarity: emergency tool or structural 
principle?  
There is, however, a missing piece in this jigsaw. Solidarity is expressly mentioned, both 
in the legal basis and in the text of the Regulation, as the underlying principle the 
emergency support mechanism is built upon. The reference to solidarity elicits 
interesting questions on the meaning and of this principle. Is it possible to draw any 
conclusions as to the structure and significance of the principle of subsidiarity from the 
analysis of its implementation through the establishment of the emergency support 
mechanism? More specifically, how does the reference to solidarity in the Regulation 
relate to the role subsidiarity plays in the context of asylum and migration law? Do they 
express a similar understanding of the concept, or rather evoke different dimensions of 
 
33 For an exception, see L. DEN HERTOG, EU Budgetary Responses to the ‘Refugee Crisis’. Reconfiguring the 
Funding Landscape, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, in CEPS, May 2016, www.ceps.eu. 
34 M. DEN HEIJER, J. RIJPMA, TH. SPIJKERBOER, Coercion, Prohibition, and Great Expectations: The Continuing 
Failure of the Common European Asylum System, in Common Market Law Review, 2016, p. 607 et seq.; see 
also B. NASCIMBENE, Refugees, the European Union and the “Dublin system”, cit., p. 105 et seq. 
35 See S. CARRERA, L. DEN HERTOG, A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a name?, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, in CEPS, March 2016, www.ceps.eu, p. 2. 
36 Communication COM(2015) 490 final/2, cit., p. 9 et seq. 
37 L. DEN HARTOG, EU Budgetary Responses, cit., p. 6. 
38 L. DEN HARTOG, EU Budgetary Responses, cit., p. 1. 
39 See P. DE BRUYCKER, The European Border and Coast Guard, cit., p. 568. 
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the solidarity principle? If the latter is true, how do different understandings of 
solidarity relate to one another? 
Solidarity is undoubtedly an important principle in the European legal order and is 
mentioned by several Treaty provisions across a wide range of policy fields, from the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the energy sector. Yet, whereas solidarity 
is widely regarded as a fundamental principle, there is no uniform understanding of this 
notion. Solidarity has thus been described as a “paradoxical figure”, which underpins 
the entire architecture of the European Union but defies definition.40 Apart from a few 
bold references in the early years, where the Court of Justice referred to it as a 
foundation of the Communities,41 solidarity also plays a very limited role as an 
autonomous principle in the case law.42 
The difficulty in defining the principle of solidarity may at least partially depend on 
the fact that it includes several dimensions.43  
In most instances, the Treaties refer to an inter-State dimension of solidarity, such as 
in the solidarity clause enshrined in Art. 222 TFEU44 or in the context of the Common 
foreign and security policy, where EU action shall be “based on the development of 
mutual political solidarity among Member States” (Art. 24, para. 2, TEU). Here solidarity, 
requiring “joint action” by the EU and its Member States, is clearly understood as solidarity 
between Member States (and possibly, between Member States and the Union). 
Other provisions, however, introduce a different reading of the notion, referring to 
solidarity as a principle governing the joint production of collective goods within 
Member States, such as where the Treaty mentions solidarity between generations (Art. 
3, para. 3, TEU). In addition, the Treaties sometimes also refer to “solidarity among 
peoples” (Art. 3, para. 5, TEU), a wording that may indicate either solidarity within 
 
40 S. DE LA ROSA, La transversalité de la solidarité dans les politiques matérielles de l’Union, in C. BOUTAYEB 
(ed.), La solidarité dans l’Union européenne. Éléments constitutionnels et matériels, Paris: Dalloz, 2011, p. 165. 
41 Court of Justice, judgment of 10 December 1969, joined cases 6 and 11/69, Commission v. France, 
para. 16; Court of Justice, judgment of 29 June 1978, case 77/77, Benzine en Petroleum 
Handelsmaatschappij BV and others v. Commission of the European Communities, para. 15. 
42 A. VON BODGANDY, Founding Principles, in A. VON BODGANDY, J. BAST (eds), Principles of EU Constitutional 
Law, Oxford: Hart, 2010, p. 53. 
43 See A. SANGIOVANNI, Solidarity in the European Union, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2013, p. 221 
et seq. 
44 It provides that “[t]he Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a 
Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. See M. 
GESTRI, EU Disaster Response Law: Principles and Instruments, in A. DE GUTTRY, M. GESTRI, G. VENTURINI (eds), 
International Disaster Response Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2012, p. 109 et seq.; S. BLOCKMANS, 
L'Union fait la Force: Making the Most of the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU), in I. GOVAERE, S. POLI (eds), EU 
Management of Global Emergencies, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014, p. 111 et seq. 
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Member States or cross-border solidarity between citizens of different Member States – 
transnational solidarity, according to the classification proposed by Sangiovanni.45 
When one attempts to fit Regulation 2016/369 into this classification, one discovers, 
however, that these categories do not apply rigidly. Given that the legal basis refers to 
“solidarity between Member States”, it might be expected that this dimension be 
predominant. Yet, the Regulation evokes “solidarity between people”,46 a wording which 
appears understandable since the aim of the Regulation, more than to ensure just a fair 
burden-sharing between Member States, is to directly mobilize resources for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance to disaster-stricken people. It appears, therefore, 
that different dimensions of solidarity are closely intertwined and coexist in the 
operation of the mechanism. 
Furthermore, the assumption that the EU Treaties and secondary law refer to 
different meanings and dimensions of solidarity is also true in another sense, as 
suggested by an overall view of the implications this principle has in the field of asylum 
and migration policy. 
Both Art. 67, para. 2, and Art. 80 TFEU recall the principle of solidarity, albeit in 
different ways. According to Art. 67, para. 2, TFEU, the common European policy on 
asylum, immigration and external border control shall be “based on solidarity between 
Member States”. Art. 80 TFEU articulates the concept in more detail, providing that EU 
policies in this area are guided by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, “including its financial implications”. Art. 80 TFEU is therefore more 
precise than Art. 67, para. 2, and arguably introduces a yardstick against which to 
assess the legality of EU measures.47 
It is thus clear that financial measures taken in response to a situation of 
emergency, such as those envisaged by Regulation 2016/369, are far from exhausting 
the legal implications of solidarity for the common asylum and migration policy.48 To 
this aim, emergency-driven measures are simply not sufficient. 
This very finding suggests a further reflection. The emergency support mechanism 
rests on a notion of solidarity which only surfaces under exceptional circumstances: 
solidarity is understood as a remedy to a situation of emergency, where intervention is 
required to redress the consequences of events beyond ordinary business. It is the same 
view of solidarity that appears, for instance, in the solidarity clause of Art. 222 TFEU. 
 
45 A. SANGIOVANNI, Solidarity in the European Union, cit., p. 232 et seq. On the notion of transnational 
solidarity see also F. DE WITTE, Justice in the EU. The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015. 
46 See Regulation 2016/369, recital 1. 
47 See J. BAST, Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law, in European 
Public Law, 2016, p. 292 et seq. 
48 See C. FAVILLI, L’Unione europea e la difficile attuazione del principio di solidarietà ̀ nella gestione 
dell’«emergenza» immigrazione, in Quaderni Costituzionali, 2015, p. 785 et seq. 
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The reference to solidarity as an underlying policy principle contained in Art. 80 
TFEU, however, highlights the existence of a different and more comprehensive 
dimension of solidarity, one that addresses the relations between Member States 
beyond the emergency, in the ordinary process of decision-making and implementation 
of common policies. This “structural” dimension of solidarity is only slowly emerging 
and is facing strong resistance on the part of numerous Member States.  
It appears, then, that the emergency-oriented and the structural dimension of 
solidarity could relate to one another in two different ways. On the one hand, they 
could be viewed as alternative: in this perspective, the provision of financial support, 
directly or indirectly, to the Member States most affected by the massive inflow of 
migrants would be a proxy for the adoption of common rules based on a more 
balanced burden-sharing between the Member States, especially as regards the 
distribution of asylum-seekers. However, the problem with this solution is that it rests 
on a short-term logic and fails to address systemic deficiencies in the reception of 
refugees and processing of asylum applications. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to view the two dimensions of solidarity as 
complementary rather than alternative. In this vein, by conveying the idea that more 
solidarity is needed to face a given situation, emergency-driven crisis management 
measures may not only contribute to mitigate the consequences of the crisis, but also 
lay the basis for acceptance of common rules requiring a higher level of solidarity 
between Member States. The recent Commission proposal for the reform of the Dublin 
regulation49 is certainly a step in the right direction, but it is well-known that it faces 
hostility from certain Member States and their public opinion. It is therefore still too 
early to predict whether this path will eventually be followed. 
 
49 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast), COM(2016)270 final. 
